We study how uncertainty and risk aversion affect international agreements to supply global public goods. We consider a benchmark model with homogeneous countries and linear payoffs. When countries directly contribute to a public good, uncertainty tends to lower signatories' efforts but may increase participation. Despite risk aversion, uncertainty may improve welfare. In contrast, when countries try to reduce a global public bad, uncertainty tends to increase signatories' efforts and decrease participation. In that case, an ex-ante reduction of uncertainty may have a large positive multiplier effect on welfare.
Introduction
In this paper, we study how uncertainty and risk aversion affect international agreements to supply global public goods. When a public good is truly global, as with climate, disease eradication, or research on energy, the effort of one country benefits to all. 1 The problem of free-riding tends to be exacerbated by the international dimension. The principle of national sovereignty means that countries cannot be coerced into joining an agreement to supply the public good.
Countries staying out of the agreement free-ride on those within. Given the importance of this issue, it is critical to understand the determinants of international cooperation and how it could be facilitated.
Uncertainty is a key feature of most global public goods. Consider, for instance, research on nuclear fusion. Many countries have agreed to fund coordinated work on an experimental fusion reactor. 2 Yet, the chances of success and ultimate social benefits of the project are very uncertain.
Uncertainty, of course, also plays a central role in the science, economics and politics of climate change. The link between actions (CO 2 emissions) and consequences (damages due to climate change) is subject to multiple layers of uncertainty. This has greatly hindered the establishment of effective international cooperation to address "the biggest market failure the world has seen", see Stern (2008) .
Under risk aversion, uncertainty itself adds significant costs. Indeed, this partly explains the magnitude of the welfare loss estimates obtained in the Stern review, see Stern (2007) . More generally, economists working on integrated assessment models usually assume risk aversion and this has first-order effects on the outcomes, see e.g. Nordhaus (1994) , Heal and Kriström (2002) .
In these models, an ex-ante reduction of uncertainty has straightforward positive effects. While this property is well-grounded in situations with a unique decision-maker, its validity in a strategic setting is less clear. How does uncertainty affect the emergence of international cooperation aimed at supplying a global public good? Does an ex-ante reduction of uncertainty always help cooperation, or could it have negative effects? Through what channels does uncertainty affect the incentives to join or quit an international coalition? How does uncertainty affect welfare in a second-best context characterized by partial, endogenous cooperation? We seek to provide formal answers to these questions.
To do so, we extend the model of treaty formation with linear payoffs discussed in Barrett (2003) . This model is simple and well-understood. It provides a natural benchmark to incorporate and analyze new features. 3 Countries face a n-player prisoner's dilemma and can join a coalition trying to take collective action. We consider two formulations of the model: one where countries contribute to a global public good, such as R&D, and one where countries seek to reduce the production of a global public bad like CO 2 emissions. In both formulations, we introduce two new assumptions. First, the benefits from collective action are subject to uncertainty. 4 This notably captures uncertainty on pollution damages. Second, countries have risk averse preferences. 5 We study how uncertainty and risk aversion affect the outcomes of the treaty formation game and especially effort, participation and welfare in equilibrium.
We find strong effects. Surprisingly, the two formulations yield radically different outcomes.
Uncertainty tends to increase participation and improve welfare in the public good formulation.
3 And, indeed, many authors have built on this model, see e.g. Barrett (2001) , Kolstad (2007) , Rubio & Ulph (2007) , Ulph (2004) . 4 We also study an extension of the baseline model where the costs of action are subject to uncertainty. 5 Economists often view countries as risk neutral due to their size and to the possibility to pool independent risks across individuals, see Arrow and Lund (1970) . This view, however, is not appropriate to think about climate change and most other global issues. Climate risks are highly correlated within communities and potential damages are large, involving a sizable portion of the economies even in conservative estimates.
In contrast, it tends to reduce participation and welfare in the public bad one. This difference in outcomes arises from the different consequences of free-riding in the two models. In either case, countries who do not sign the treaty exert no effort. In the first formulation, it means that they do not contribute to the public good. Signatories' payoffs thus only depend on their own effort, and the variability of these payoffs increases with effort. Welfare is more uncertain for higher levels of signatories' contribution. Because of risk aversion, uncertainty then tends to decrease the contribution of signatory countries at any level of participation. Cooperation is not fixed, however. Stability of the treaty requires signatories to reach a critical mass. A treaty is stable at the precise level of participation such that an additional country signing has little effect while a country leaving has a strong impact. Because of the decreased contribution schedule, this threshold level is shifted to the right. Thus, while effort tends to decrease at given participation levels, participation itself tends to increase in equilibrium.
The mechanism is similar but leads to opposite outcomes in the public bad formulation.
Countries who free-ride pollute as usual. This now generates an important background risk faced by signatory countries. As a consequence, the variability of signatories' payoffs becomes negatively related to signatories' effort. Signatories tend to increase their effort under uncertainty at any level of participation to shield themselves against this risk. Again, participation is not fixed and the critical mass of countries necessary to obtain a stable treaty is now shifted to the left. In the public bad formulation, participation tends to decrease under uncertainty.
In addition, we find that multiple equilibria may emerge in some circumstances. 6 A stable treaty with low action and low participation may coexist with one with high action and high participation. Multiplicity, however, appears more likely in the public good formulation.
Finally, we study the robustness of our analysis to uncertainty on the cost of collective action.
We find that our main results extend to a setting with uncertain costs and that some new, and somewhat subtle, differences arise between outcomes in the two formulations.
Thus, our analysis uncovers important strategic effects associated to an ex-ante reduction of uncertainty on international agreements. When trying to provide a public good, reducing uncertainty may hurt the establishment of international cooperation. When trying to reduce a public bad, reducing uncertainty may in contrast have a positive multiplier effect due to an increase in participation.
Our analysis contributes to two literatures. First, there is an active research agenda studying international environmental agreements, see Barrett (2003) . Uncertainty is mostly ignored in this literature, however, with the exception of a few papers studying the effect of learning under risk neutrality. 7 These papers usually contrast different timings for the resolution of uncertainty. For instance, Kolstad (2007) shows in a static framework that it may be better to negotiate after uncertainty is resolved rather than before. In contrast, Ulph (2004) finds that, in a model with two periods, the positive effects of learning may not be robust to the introduction of renegotiation between periods. 8 We do not look at learning here. Rather, we relax the assumption of risk neutrality. We provide the first analysis of the effect of risk aversion on international environmental agreements. To our knowledge, the finding that the two formulations yield radically different outcomes is the first of its kind in this literature. 9
Second, a growing literature examines the effect of uncertainty and risk aversion in strategic settings. 10 Especially, Bramoullé and Treich (2009) Kolstad (2007 Kolstad ( , 2005 , Ulph (2004) , Ulph and Maddison (1997) , Na and Shi (1998) . 8 Also, it may be easier to reach an agreement before the "veil of uncertainty" has been pierced. Kolstad (2005) and Na and Shi (1998) provide some supporting arguments, under risk neutrality.
9 In all existing models, the two formulations are equivalent. 10 See e.g. Gradstein et al. (1992) , Sandler and Sterbenz (1990) on the exploitation of a renewable resource, Eso and White (2004) on auctions, and White (2008) on bargaining.
uncertainty. They assume that countries do not cooperate and find that uncertainty may decrease emissions and increase welfare in equilibrium. In contrast, we endogenize cooperation in this paper. In circumstances where participation is not affected, we indeed find similar results. 11
However, cooperation levels are usually affected and in ways leading to a reversal of the effect of uncertainty. Thus, reducing uncertainty before international negotiations take place could have a large, positive multiplier effect.
Our analysis is also related to the literature on discrete public goods and uncertainty. In this literature, the public good is binary and provided only if private contributions exceed a required threshold level. When this level is certain the first best outcome can be attained in equilibrium, as shown early on by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) . Several authors have studied how uncertainty on the threshold contribution level affects the analysis. Nitzan and Romano (1990) find that uncertainty often leads to inefficiency and underprovision of the public good, see also Suleiman (1997) . In contrast, McBride (2006) finds that, in some circumstances, an increase in uncertainty can increase equilibrium contributions and welfare. 12 As here, these studies emphasize the strategic effects of uncertainty in a context of public good provision. However, our analysis differs from these studies in key respects. In our setup, the public good is continuous and not subject to an exogenous contribution threshold. 13 Rather, a threshold level of participation emerges endogenously from stability conditions in the treaty game. Moreover, while this threshold level depends on uncertainty, it is itself not uncertain. It depends in a non-stochastic way on the level of risk affecting the economic parameters. Finally, the distinction between the public good 11 This may happen, for instance, following a small enough increase in uncertainty. 12 The intuition is that when uncertainty is greater, there is more variation in possible values of the threshold contribution level, which may increase the equilibrium probability that an agent is pivotal and his incentives to contribute.
13 This notably means that the continuous public good is severely under-provided under certainty, in contrast to what happens in the discrete case. and the public bad formulations plays a central role here, but is absent from these studies. 14 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 analyzes the case where countries directly contribute to a global public good. Section 4 looks at the reduction of a global public bad. Section 5 extends the analysis to uncertain costs and Section 6 concludes.
The Model
In this section, we introduce uncertainty and risk aversion to the model of Barrett (2003) . We study two different formulations of the model. While under risk neutrality these two formulations are generally equivalent, we will show that they lead to remarkably different conclusions under risk aversion. Consider n identical countries who face a problem of collective action. In the public good formulation, each country i exerts some costly effort q i which benefits to all other countries.
Individual payoff is equal to b( n j=1 q j ) − cq i where b represents the marginal benefit from overall effort and c the marginal cost from individual effort. Because payoff is linear, we assume that there is a maximal level of effort q max . This public good formulation captures situations where countries may directly contribute to a public good, such as R&D.
In contrast in the public bad formulation, countries seek to reduce the emissions of a global pollutant. Country i emits a level e i ∈ [0, q max ] where q max represents business as usual emissions.
Individual payoff is equal to ce i − b( n j=1 e j ). Effort q i represents the level of reduction of emissions: q i = q max − e i . 15 The parameter c now represents the private marginal benefit from pollution while b captures the marginal social damage. In fact, they have the same interpretation as in the public good formulation since abating one unit in one country costs c and increases the 14 Also, we look at risk averse countries while the literature on discrete public goods has, so far, focused on risk neutral agents.
15 Expressed in terms of efforts, individual payoff is now equal to: b(
payoff of all countries by b.
Our main assumption is that the marginal social benefit b is subject to uncertainty. For simplicity, we suppose that b can take two values. 16 Marginal benefit b is equal to b L with probability p and to b H > b L with probability 1 − p. It is useful to introduce the expected marginal benefitb = pb L + (1 − p)b H . In contrast, uncertainty does not affect the marginal cost of effort c in our baseline model. 17 We study how our analysis is affected by cost uncertainty in section 5.
Preferences of countries towards risk are identical, and represented by a strictly increasing and concave Von-Neumann Morgenstern utility function U . Thus, country i seeks to maximize his expected utility
in the public good formulation, and
in the public bad one. Since countries are ex-ante identical, we define social welfare W as the sum of the expected utilities of all countries. As in the model with certainty, we consider two restrictions on the parameters. First, b H < c, so that playing q i = 0 or e i = q max is a strictly dominant strategy for all countries in the game without treaty. Second, nb L > c, so that the firstbest outcome requires q i = q max or e i = 0 for all i. Without treaty, there is severe under-provision 16 Some of our results are valid for any distribution of the parameter, see the discussion in conclusion. 17 In a climate change context, this assumption reflects the fact that scientific uncertainty has little effect on private abatement costs, but is a main source of uncertainty regarding the future damages from greenhouse gas emissions.
of the public good.
To study the formation of an international environmental agreement, we adopt the approach pioneered by Barrett (1994) . Countries have to decide whether to join an international agreement before contributing to the global public good. More precisely, the game with treaty unfolds in three stages:
Stage 1 Simultaneously and independently, all countries decide to sign or not to sign the agreement.
In what follows, we denote by k, the number of signatories.
Stage 2 Signatories choose their effort in order to maximize their collective payoff.
Stage 3 Non-signatories independently choose the effort maximizing their individual payoff.
A key feature of our approach is that uncertainty is resolved after stage 3. Therefore, countries are uncertain about the state of the world when deciding whether to sign the agreement. Our main objective is to study how uncertainty and risk aversion affects this decision, and hence the existence and properties of a stable treaty. We make use of the usual notion of stability. Definition 1. A treaty is stable when signatories have no incentive to quit and non-signatories have no incentive to join.
Conditions for stability can be formally summarized with a unique function ∆. Given symmetry and concavity, non-signatories will play identical actions, and this holds for signatories as well. Therefore, we denote by q s (k) and q ns (k) the optimal levels of effort exerted respectively by a signatory and a non-signatory country when the number of signatories is equal to k, and by U s (k) and U ns (k) their expected utilities. We introduce ∆(k) = U s (k) − U ns (k − 1) which represents the net benefit to a signatory of staying in the agreement. The fact that a non-signatory country does not want to join at k * is equivalent to the fact that a signatory country wants to quit at We next analyze the treaty game under uncertainty. Since b L < b H < c, a non-signatory country always plays q ns = 0 or e ns = q max no matter the number or the actions of signatories. This solves Stage 3. We study the two formulations, in turn, in what follows. In each case, we first study Stage 2 and the actions of signatories. This study is critical to understand when a treaty is stable. The analysis under certainty illustrates how the shape of q s determines stability.
Under certainty, q s is a step function and k * is the first integer situated just above the step. On the one hand, q s (k * ) = q max and q s (k * − 1) = 0. If a signatory quits, the drop in collective action is very large, hence a signatory does not want to quit. On the other hand, q s (k * + 1) = q s (k * ). If a non-signatory joins, the other signatories do not change what they do, which gives no incentives 18 A treaty with n signatories is stable if and only if ∆(n) ≥ 0. In that case, all countries are signatories, and the condition on non-signatory countries disappears.
for non-signatories to join. The general intuition carries over more generally. A signatory does not want to quit if he expects that his departure would induce a high drop in the actions of the remaining signatories. In contrast, a non-signatory does not want to join if he anticipates his decision to yield little increase, or even a decrease, in overall effort. We then make use of our study of q s to analyze Stage 1, and the existence and properties of stable treaties in both formulations.
3 Providing a global public good
Signatories' actions
In this section, we study the actions of signatories q s (k) when countries contribute to a global public good. We have three results. First, we find that the bang-bang property which characterizes q s under certainty partially disappears under uncertainty. Effort may take intermediate values in situations where action is desirable in one state of the world but not in the other. In that case, signatories trade-off the benefit of action in one state against its cost in the other.
Second, we find that uncertainty unambiguously lowers q s . Holding k constant, an increase in uncertainty always leads to a (weak) decrease in signatories' efforts. And third, we show that an increase in risk aversion has a similar effect and also lowers signatories' actions.
Recall, signatories jointly decide how to maximize their collective welfare, defined as the sum of their expected utilities. It means that q s is the solution of the following program:
We first describe when the solution is at a corner. Observe that the objective function is strictly (1) can be written as follows: Then, q s is equal to the solution of this first-order condition if this solution is lower than q max , and to q max otherwise. In any case, q s (k) is continuous over [0, n] when k is allowed to take real values. In summary, Proposition 1. Effort q s exerted by a signatory country when k countries have signed the treaty is such that: Signatories' effort under uncertainty is always lower than or equal to effort under certainty.
Observe that when b L =b, there is no uncertainty and Proposition (1) reduces to the result described in the previous section.
Given that q s varies from 0 to q max , a natural question is whether q s is necessarily increasing
. Does more participation always lead to a higher effort per signatory? It turns out that the answer is negative. Even with standard preferences, q s may be decreasing over some range of participation levels. We explore this issue in more detail in the Appendix. We show that if the level of absolute risk aversion is decreasing and decreases sufficiently rapidly, then q s is indeed non decreasing. However, monotonicity of q s in general is ambiguous and we provide counterexamples below.
We next study the effect of an increase in uncertainty on q s (k). Proposition (1) shows that q s (k) is lower under uncertainty than under certainty. Our next result shows that this property holds more generally for any increase in uncertainty in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1974) .
Let b and b be two binary distributions of marginal benefit values with the same expected valuē
). An increase in uncertainty always reduces signatories' actions.
The intuition behind this result can be seen by looking at the expected value and the variance of ex-post payoffs π for signatories. Here,
, an increase in q increases the expected payoff and also increases its variance. One is desirable, but the other is not under risk aversion. The optimal choice of q results from a trade-off between these two motives. 19 Then, holding q and k constant, an increase in uncertainty leads to an increase in the payoff's variance while leaving its expected value unchanged. The marginal effect of a decrease in q on the variance is greater when uncertainty is greater, hence signatories' action is lower.
This effect is confirmed by looking at an increase in risk aversion. Recall that utility function V represents more risk averse preferences than U if there is an increasing and concave function Φ such that V = Φ(U ). In our context, the effect of risk aversion is similar to the effect of uncertainty.
Proposition 3. Suppose that countries with utility V are more risk averse than countries with
). An increase in risk aversion always reduces signatories' efforts.
For a given participation level, uncertainty and risk aversion tend to reduce signatories'actions.
Signatories exert less effort in order to diminish the variability of their payoffs. While this effect may seem to be purely negative (lower level of collective action), we will see in the next section that it can have a positive indirect consequence. Lower action at all participation levels may increase the participation level that is sustainable in equilibrium.
To conclude on signatories' actions, we look at specific utility functions. We are able to obtain closed-form expressions in three important cases. These expressions are useful for applications and numerical simulations, and also allow us to obtain more precise information on the shape and monotonicity of q s . Corresponding expressions can easily be derived for the public bad formulation. Denote byq s (k) the solution to equation (2). 20
Quadratic utility. Suppose that U (π) = π − λπ 2 . We impose that (nb H − c)q max ≤ 1/(2λ) to ensure that utility is strictly increasing over the strategy space. We have:
We show in the Appendix that q s is non decreasing in k when U is quadratic.
CARA utility. Suppose that U (π) = −e −Aπ where A denotes the level of absolute risk aversion.
We obtain:q
We ask whether q s is increasing in k and find that two cases appear. Either q s is increasing, or it is first increasing, then decreasing, and again increasing over [c/b, c/b L ]. Also, q s is more likely to be increasing when p is higher. Figure 1 illustrates.
Ficture 1 : Effort with uncertainty, CARA function
Introducing a baseline payoff π 0 is necessary to ensure that ex-post payoffs are always positive.
Especially, when γ = 1 this reduces toq
, which is clearly increasing in k. This may not necessarily be the case, however, when γ = 1.
Stable treaties
In this section, we study the properties of stable treaties. We first show that a stable treaty always exists and that participation in any stable treaty is always higher than under certainty. We then characterize participation in the best stable treaty when q max is large enough. We finally discuss the impact of uncertainty on welfare and illustrate these effects through numerical simulations.
We first show that a stable treaty with positive action always exists. given linearity of the payoffs, should be as high as possible. If q max is large, the drop in collective action if one country quits is large, which gives an incentive for signatories to stay in the treaty. 21
How does uncertainty affect welfare in a stable treaty? In this model, uncertainty affects welfare through three different channels. First, holding q s and k fixed, it has a direct negative effect resulting from risk aversion. Second, Proposition 2 shows that, holding k fixed, it has an indirect negative effect through its reduction of q s (k). Finally, there is a third countervailing effect. Proposition 4 shows that uncertainty has a positive impact on participation k * . This third effect may overcome the the first two and lead to an overall increase in welfare. Note that when q s = q max , the second effect disappears but the effect of uncertainty on welfare is still ambiguous.
In this case, eliminating uncertainty lowers the incentives to participate. In the end, an ex-ante reduction of uncertainty may hurt the prospects for international cooperation on the provision of a global public good. When countries try to reduce a global public bad, optimal signatories' emissions solve the following program:
The study of this program, in Appendix, yields the following result.
Proposition 6. In the public bad formulation, the emissions e s of a signatory country when k countries have signed the treaty is such that: Signatories' effort under uncertainty is always higher than or equal to effort under certainty.
Comparing Propositions 6 and 1, we see similarities as well as key differences between the two formulations. The solution still lies at a corner except maybe when action is desirable in one state of the world but not in the other. However, the precise ranges where effort may take intermediate values differ. Effort becomes maximal at different threshold participation levels: c/b in the public bad formulation, c/b L in the public good one. A striking consequence is that uncertainty has opposite effects on signatories' efforts in both formulations. Uncertainty increases effort in the public bad formulation but lowers it in the public good one. We will see below that this also induces opposite effects on participation.
The main reason behind this difference lies in the impact of non-signatories' actions. In both cases, non-signatories do not exert any effort. When countries contribute to a public good, the baseline payoff for signatories is simply equal to zero. In contrast, in a context of global pollution, no effort yields pollution damages. Signatories thus face a baseline uncertain loss caused by nonsignatories' emissions. As is well-known, the presence of a background risk may deeply affect decisions of risk averse agents, see Gollier (2001) .
Our next results confirm this reversal in qualitative outcomes. We look at the impacts of an increase in uncertainty and an increase in risk aversion. We provide the counterparts to Propositions 2 and 3 for the public bad formulation.
Proposition 7. Consider the public bad formulation and suppose that b is more risky than b.
). An increase in uncertainty always increases signatories' effort.
Proposition 8. Consider the public bad formulation and suppose that agents with utility V are more risk averse than agents with utility U . Then ∀k ∈ [0, n], e s (k, V ) ≤ e s (k, U ). An increase in risk aversion always increases signatories' efforts.
Holding participation constant, signatories reduce their emissions and increase their efforts if uncertainty or risk aversion increases. These results are similar to results obtained in Bramoullé and Treich (2009) . Indeed, they have a common explanation. The variance of the payoff is now
and is increasing in emissions. If uncertainty is higher, the payoff's variance is higher. To compensate, risk averse agents tend to decrease their emissions. Thus, exerting more effort reduces the payoff's variance in the public bad formulation but increases it in the public good one. This leads to opposite effects on signatories' actions hence, as we see next, on participation.
We study stable treaties in a context of global pollution. We first show that the argument behind Proposition 4 extends. However, its conclusion is reversed. We emphasize two important differences between Proposition 10 and 5. One one hand, this result is more restrictive since we now need to make an assumption on the shape of preference towards risk. The reason relies, again, on the effect of non-signatories' actions. As q max increases, signatories face increasingly dire prospects. The background risk generated by non-signatories' emissions becomes worse. If risk aversion is constant or decreasing, this increases the incentives for signatories to exert effort. 23 On the other hand, this result is also sharper since we now get uniqueness of the stable treaty when business as usual emissions are high enough. This indicates that equilibrium multiplicity may generally be less frequent in the public bad formulation. 24 23 We suspect, but have not shown, that the result may not hold under increasing absolute risk aversion. Signatories would then tend to become less risk averse when faced with a worse baseline situation.
24 And indeed, multiplicity did not appear in the simulations we ran under the public bad formulation.
Finally, how does uncertainty affect welfare in a stable treaty? As in the public good formulation, uncertainty has three distinct effects on welfare. The first is similarly negative. Holding k and q s fixed, uncertainty decreases welfare because of risk aversion. In contrast, the second effect has an opposite sign. Holding k fixed, uncertainty tends to increase signatories' efforts which improves welfare. However, the third effect also has an opposite sign. As shown in Propostion 9, uncertainty tends to decrease participation and this has a negative impact on welfare. In cases where e = 0 and effort is maximal, the second effect disappears and uncertainty unambiguously lowers welfare. This arises, for instance, in situations identified by Proposition 10. When this happens, an ex-ante reduction of uncertainty has a positive "multiplier" effect in a context of global pollution. This multiplier effect is purely strategic in nature. It captures the increased incentives to participate caused by the reduction of uncertainty.
As in the previous section, we run numerical simulations to illustrate, see Observe first that here the stable treaty is unique. As uncertainty increases, participation decreases. Figure 6 shows the existence of a threshold value for b H such participation is equal to 10 below this value and drops to 9 above it. When k * = 10, Figure 5 shows that effort is maximal. When it drops to k * = 9, signatories' effort first drops discontinuously and then increases as uncertainty increases. The initial drop is consistent with the fact that, for given parameter values, effort tends to decrease if participation decreases. The following increase in effort illustrates Proposition 7: holding participation constant, effort increases as uncertainty 25 To facilitate comparison with the public good formulation, we look here at effort rather than emissions.
increases.
Next, look at welfare. As long as k * = 10, q and k * are constant and welfare decreases due to the direct negative effect of uncertainty. When k * drops from 10 to 9, welfare also drops under the combined effect of the reduction in participation and the reduction in effort. When k * = 9, we see a trade-off emerging between the direct negative effect and the indirect positive effect due to higher effort. Interestingly, the resulting outcome is non-monotonic. The positive effect first dominates. But the increase in effort occurs at a decreasing rate, and at some point, the indirect positive effect is overwhelmed by the direct negative one. Again, changes in participation have a crucial impact on welfare.
Uncertainty on the cost of effort
A restrictive assumption of our baseline model is that uncertainty only affects the benefits from action. In reality, the marginal cost of effort is often uncertain as well. For instance, when negotiating an international agreement on climate change, countries may not know exactly the benefits they will derive from their future CO 2 emissions. In international R&D projects, realized costs often differ substantially from their initial estimates. In this section, we study the robustness of our results to the assumption of certain costs. We relax this assumption, and ask whether uncertainty on costs tend to counteract or to amplify uncertainty on benefits. We find that our main results extend and that some new, and somewhat subtle, differences arise between outcomes in the two formulations. Throughout this section, we assume that marginal cost of effort c is equal to c L with probability p and to c H with probability 1 − p , that cost and benefit are independent, and that c L > b H and nb L > c H . 
Providing a global public good

In any case, signatories' action is necessarily (weakly) lower under uncertain costs when
Uncertainty on costs tend to lower action at high participation levels. Does this property hold for all k? More generally, does an increase in cost uncertainty always lowers effort?
And does Proposition 2 still hold in a setting with uncertain costs? To gain some insight on these questions, we can look at the expected value and variance of the payoff. Here the expected payoff is equal to E(π) = (kb −c)q while its variance is V ar(π)
An increase in risk on cost increases the variance of the payoff without affecting its expected value, which gives an incentive to signatories to reduce their effort. As it turns out, this intuition does not carry over to all risk averse utility functions. Effects related to moments of order 3 and higher of the distribution of payoffs come into play. To obtain unambiguous results, we must impose some restrictions on the preferences, familiar from the theoretical literature on risk (Gollier (2001) ). Introduce relative prudence, denoted by P r , as:
Proposition 11. Under uncertainty on benefits and costs, if P r ≤ 2, then any increase in uncertainty on b or c reduces signatories' actions at all participation levels.
Especially, relative prudence is equal to zero, and Proposition 11 holds, if utility is quadratic.
In contrast, Proposition 11 may not hold when relative prudence is not everywhere lower than 2. Thus, even though cost uncertainty often amplifies the effect of benefit uncertainty by further lowering signatories' effort, it could in some cases go in the opposite direction. In contrast, the effect of an increase in risk aversion is unchanged and still clear-cut. We show in Appendix that Proposition 3 directly extends to uncertain costs.
In turn, cost uncertainty affects stable treaties. We show in Appendix that our proof of For the treaty identified in Proposition 12, uncertainty on costs plays a role similar to uncer-tainty on benefits. It further increase participation, hence may further increase welfare despite its direct negative effect due to risk aversion. Interestingly, participation in this best possible treaty depends on the lowest value of benefit, but of the highest value of cost. The reason is that, taken together, these two values determine the worst possible state of the world and that in turn, this state determines the critical threshold level of participation.
Reducing a global public bad
Suppose next that countries try to reduce a global public bad. For signatories' actions, we show Since c L /b H <c/b H , uncertainty on cost always (weakly) increases signatories' actions at low participation levels. As in the public good formulation, comparative statics with respect to risk are generally ambiguous. We obtain the following counterpart to Proposition 11. Introduce the level of absolute prudence, denoted by P , as:
Proposition 13. Under uncertainty on benefits and costs, if
, then any increase in uncertainty on b or c increases signatories' actions at all participation levels. This is related to standard results on the portfolio problem with a background risk, see Ch. 8.2
in Gollier (2001) . 28 Especially, say that V is more risk averse than U in the sense of Ross (1981) if V = λU + f with λ > 0 and f decreasing and concave. Then, we show in Appendix that an increase in risk aversion in the sense of Ross always leads to an increase in the action of signatories.
Finally, consider stable treaties. Existence still holds, but Proposition 10 does not extend as directly as Proposition 5. We show the following result. signatories' emissions tend to the following limit as q max tends to infinity:
In both Propositions 11 and 13, the sufficient conditions depend on the magnitude of the increase in risk. While in the first, it is captured by the index of relative prudence, in the second, it appears directly in the bound (see the Appendix for details).
27 So while Proposition 3 directly extends to uncertain costs, this is not the case for Proposition 8. 28 Most results assume independence between risks, hence cannot be applied here.
This follows from two observations. First, as q max increases, the background payoff in the bad situation −(n − k)b H q max becomes increasingly worse than the background payoff in the better 
hence that participation is lower than under certain costs if q max is high enough.
Conclusion
We conclude with a discussion of some limitations of our analysis and of promising directions for future research. In this paper, we introduce uncertainty and risk aversion to a simple model of international agreement to supply a global public good. We find that uncertainty and risk aversion significantly affect the analysis of treaty formation. They yield qualitative changes as well as significant quantitative changes on the outcomes of the game. This complexity provides some justification, ex-post, for the study of a simple benchmark model. It also raises the question of the robustness of our results. Five features of the model especially deserve attention: the fact that the risk is binary, linearity of the payoffs, homogeneity of the agents, the static dimension, and the simplicity of the policy framework.
Many of our results would directly extend to an arbitrary risk. For instance, the argument behind Propositions 1 and 6 hold in general. Similarly, our existence results Propositions 4 and 9 are valid for any risk. In contrast, signing the effects of risk and risk aversion in general may be more complicated. As is well-known from risk theory, comparative statics may be ambiguous and may involve conditions based on the third and higher derivatives of the utility function, see Gollier (2001) . Section 5 already illustrates some of these complexities in a setup with uncertain costs of action.
Linearity of the payoffs is a critical assumption. Under certainty, non-linear payoffs may lead to very different equilibria, see Barrett (2003) . An interest of the model with linear payoffs, however, is that it neatly captures the idea of critical mass. Collective action becomes worthwhile only when enough countries have joined in and once this threshold is reached, there is little benefit from an additional signatory. As such, studies of models with linear payoffs may be useful to understand what happens more generally. With any payoff function, stability captures a form of local critical mass. A treaty is stable when the drop in collective action if one country is high enough and when the addition of one signatory has little effect. Thus, we conjecture that our results may extend, under conditions to be determined, to models with non-linear payoffs.
As soon as uncertainty lowers signatories' actions, corresponding threshold levels may increase which may improve participation in equilibrium. In contrast, if uncertainty increases signatories' actions the threshold levels may decrease and participation may drop.
Under heterogeneity, anonymity is lost. The idea of local critical mass is still relevant, but the identity of the signatories and non-signatories now matters. To understand the effects of heterogeneity under uncertainty, however, we would first need to understand its effects under certainty. 29
Despite some recent advances in that direction (see, e.g., Barrett (2001) and McGinty (2007)), a general analysis of international agreements under heterogeneity is still lacking. If anything, we expect the effects of uncertainty and risk aversion to be exacerbated under heterogeneity, given that countries may differ in the risk they face and in their degree of risk aversion.
Our model is static. However, the intertemporal dimension clearly matters for many global public goods, climate change being a prime example. Several non trivial issues arise in a dynamic framework. First, the agreement may have to be renegotiated over time and the set of signatories may evolve. Second, agreements have to address the intertemporal dimension. They may, for instance, specify temporal sequences of action. Third, the timing (and conditions) of future renegotiations may itself be an important part of the negotiations. We note that the study of these issues under certainty has barely started. 30 Thus, as with heterogeneity, a general understanding of the dynamics of international agreements under certainty is still lacking. Uncertainty would have interesting and complicated dynamic effects. Especially, uncertainty generally evolves over time thanks to learning, and the learning process itself may be affected by signatories' and non signatories' actions.
Finally, our current policy framework is extremely simplified, both within and between countries. Within countries, national considerations such as elections and political constraints could very well affect countries' ability to contribute to the global public good, and hence international negotiations. And countries often interact with each other through a variety of channels such as trade, health, and foreign aid, and these other dimensions can have deep impacts on negotiations on a specific global public good. 31 It would be interesting to introduce uncertainty to a model of international agreement incorporating some of these considerations.
Overall, there is much research to be done to better understand the determinants of interna-30 See Rubio and Ulph (2007) for one of the first truly dynamic analysis of international environmental agreements in the presence of a stock pollutant.
31 See e.g. Barrett (2003, Ch. 12) , and the references therein, on linkage between different issues in international negotiations.
tional agreements in more realistic settings. In this paper, we have shown that uncertainty and risk aversion have strong strategic effects in a simple benchmark model. Given the importance of uncertainty in reality, we think that such strategic effects will also play a major role in the analysis of more realistic models incorporating arbitrary risks, general payoffs, heterogeneity, dynamics, and richer policy considerations. 
APPENDIX
Rewriting using A = −U /U shows thatq s (k) is weakly increasing iff:
From the f.o.c., we have
. Substituting, we obtain thatq s (k) is weakly increasing iff:q
, then this condition is clearly satisfied since the LHS is non-negative and the RHS is negative. This means that the level of absolute risk aversion at π H is sufficiently lower than the level of absolute risk aversion at π L ≤ π H .
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider q s as a function of b L and b H , holdingb constant . We have
Derivating this last expression with respect to b H , we see that:
The left-hand side holds for
Similarly, derivating with respect to b L , we have:
where the left-hand side also holds when
Proof of Proposition 3. Denote by F (q) = EV [(kb − c)q] the objective function of the signatories when agents have utility V . Since V = Φ(U ), we have:
(kb L − c)q, U is increasing, and Φ is decreasing, we have F (q s (U )) ≤ 0. Since F is concave, F is decreasing, and F (q s (V )) = 0, we have:
Computations for specific utilities.
Quadratic utility :
Derivating q s with respect to k, we obtain: CARA utility :
. Introduce the three following auxiliary
, and h(k) = ln[f (k)]g(k). Derivating q s with respect to k, we obtain:
This means that q s is increasing iff
We next study the properties of h. We have :
Looking at the second derivative of h gives:
which is strictly negative for
In addition, we know that q s is increasing at c/b and becomes arbitrarily large when k gets close to c/b L . This implies that q s is either increasing 
In addition, if a signatory quits at k * , he obtains (k * − 1)bq s (k * − 1). Thus, Proof of Proposition 6. If k ≤ c/b H , c − kb is less than or equal to zero in both states of the world, and strictly less than zero in one, hence signatories' emissions are clearly maximal.
Next, suppose that k ≥ c/b. The marginal expected utility of a signatory at e = 0 is equal to
weakly increasing in b by concavity of U . The covariance rule (Gollier 2001) 
Finally, E(c − kb) = c − kb ≤ 0 and EU [−(n − k)bq max ] ≥ 0, which means that the marginal expected utility at 0 is less than or equal to zero. By concavity, e s = 0. QED.
Proof of Proposition 7. Consider e s as a function of b L and b H . We have p =
, it becomes:
We now derive with respect to b L , with ∂b ∂b L = 0, we have: 
increasing, and Φ is decreasing, we have. F (e s (U )) ≥ 0. Since F concave, F decreasing, and
Proof of Proposition 10. We will show that there is aq > 0 such that if q max ≥q, then for any k ≥ c/b H , e s (k) = 0. The first order conditions of program 3 can be written
Denote byẽ s (k) its solution. When u is CARA, direct computations lead to:
If q max is large enough, this is clearly negative for any k which implies that e s (k) = 0 as soon as
Next, take the derivative of the f.o.c. with respect to q max . Algebraic computations lead to:
if ∃q 2 such thatẽ s (q 2 ) > 0, thenẽ s decreases in q max til it becomes negative for q max ≥ q 2 . In the end, ∃q > 0 such that if q max ≥q, then for any k ≥ c/b H , e s (k) = 0. QED.
Proof of Proposition 11
We show that any increase in uncertainty reduces the level of action.
Denote q * before the increase in uncertainty. If q * is not interior, the proof is obvious (see section 5.1). Then, assume that that k leads to an interior solution for q * . We use the fact that a distribution x is more risky than x iff there exist a white noise ε such that x = x + ε.
The first derivative of the problem of the coalition after the increase in risk, evaluated at q * , is: E ε E b,c U (kb − c)q * + εq * )(kb − c + ε). We can rewrite this last expression as :
If f (ε) is concave, we have : E ε E b,c f (ε) ≤ E b,c f (0) = 0 (Jensen's inequality), so the optimal level of action has to be lower for higher risks (since U is strictly concave). We can compute Since a country has a strict incentive to join the treaty at k 1 , and no incentive to join at k 2 , we know that there exist a stable treaty k * ∈ [k 1 , k 2 ]. Suppose that e(k * ) = q max , then it means that there exists k 3 such that e(k 3 ) < e(k 3 + 1). Then, at k 3 , no country has an incentive to join the coalition. There exists a stable treatyk ∈ [k 1 , k 3 ]. Since e(k 1 ) < q max , we know that there exists some stable treaty with strictly positive action.
Proof of Proposition 13
We show that any increase in uncertainty increases the level of action. Denote e * the optimal level of emissions for a given level of uncertainty. If e * is not interior, the solution is obvious. Then, assume that that k leads to an interior solution for e * . The proof goes as the one of proposition 11. First, we look at an increase in risk through c. The first derivative of the problem of the coalition after the increase in risk, evaluated at e * , is: E ε E b,c U (c + ε − kb)q * )(c − kb + ε). We can rewrite this last expression as :E ε E b,c f (ε). If f (ε) is concave, we know that the optimal level of emissions has to be lower for higher risks (since U is strictly concave). We can compute f (ε) = U e * 2 (c − kb + ε) + 2U e * , so f (ε) ≤ 0 iff − U U e * (c − kb + ε) ≤ 2.
Next, we look at an increase in risk through b. Proceeding the same way, we find that f (ε) ≤ 0 iff − U U (ke * + (n − k)q max )(c − kb − kε)/k ≤ 2
Denote c H and b L , the highest possible cost, and the lowest possible benefit after the increase in risk, then a sufficient for both conditions is:
Proof of Proposition 14 Suppose that U respects CARA or DARA. We show that if q max is high enough, q s (k) = q max for all k ≥c/b H , and that any stable treaty k * respects c L /b H ≤ k ≤c/b H . First, define π(e) = E b,c u((c − kb)e − (n − k)bq max ). Since π < 0, we have e = 0 ⇔ π (0) < 0, where π (0) = E b (c − kb)u (−(n − k)bq max ), the expected marginal utility at e = 0. Next, we know that f (x) − f (y) = f (z)(x − y) with z ∈ [x, y] which means that u (−(n −
Thus,
Since u is DARA, prudence holds, u > 0, hence (−u) is decreasing. Since −(n − k)bq max ≤ −(n−k)b L q max , we have (−u )(−(n−k)bq max ) ≥ (−u )(−(n−k)b L q max ). Hence 
